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ABSTRACT 
 
The present study empirically investigates the link between corporate voluntary disclosure and 
firm performance. The empirical analyses show a positive relationship between disclosure indexes 
and firm performance proxies. They provide evidence that the level of voluntary information 
disclosed in annual reports plays a significant signaling role of firm performance. However, the 
extent of this role depends on the nature of the voluntary disclosure, i.e. strategic, financial or 
corporate governance information.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his study examines the relationship between corporate voluntary disclosure and firm performance. 
According to signaling theory (Spence, 1973), the main objective of firm disclosure is to inform 
analysts and investors of about the firm quality and value. In this regard, Verrecchia (1983) suggests 
that corporate disclosure helps analysts and investors to predict future earnings, as corporate managers have to 
disclose value-relevant information. 
 
Numerous studies demonstrate that the informativeness of voluntary disclosure reduces the cost of capital 
(Francis et al., 2008; Karamanou and Nishiotis, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2011) and increases the firm value (Lajili and 
Zeghal, 2006; Banghøj and Plenborg, 2008; Cheung et al., 2010; Hassan and Mohd-Saleh, 2010; Al-Akraa and 
Jahangir-Ali, 2012). Some other studies especially focus on corporate voluntary disclosure in annual reports. These 
reports are the main documents published by firms and are generally used by stakeholders to assess firm 
performance (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Banghøj and Plenborg, 2008; Hassan et al., 2009; Uyar and Kiliç, 2012). 
Hence, previous research on voluntary disclosure demonstrates that relevant corporate information reveals firm 
value. The present paper extends this previous research and investigates whether the extent of voluntary disclosure 
in annual reports signalizes firm performance.  
 
For the empirical analyses, we use panel data of 1074 firms-years listed on the Euronext Paris stock 
exchange. Firstly, we deploy a non-parametric approach to assess firm performance. In particular, we rely on data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure the firm ability to maximize its value (output) given a set of determinants 
(inputs). Secondly, we employ a parametric approach to explain firm performance proxies. We consider the 
estimated efficiency scores obtained from the DEA approach as a dependent variable. In parallel, we use disclosure 
indexes, which measure the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports, as independent variables.  
 
The empirical findings show a positive relationship between disclosure indexes and performance measures. 
They provide evidence that the level of voluntary information disclosed in annual reports plays a significant 
signaling role of firm performance. However, the extent of this role depends on the nature of the voluntary 
disclosure, i.e. strategic, financial or corporate governance information. The findings presented and discussed in this 
article should provide useful insights for academics as well as practitioners. As far as we know, this study is one of 
the first, especially in the French context, to consider the multidimensionality of firm performance when 
investigating whether the extent of voluntary disclosure signalizes corporate performance. Thus, the methodological 
T 
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approach and the empirical results of this research enrich the existing literature on the signaling role of corporate 
voluntary disclosure, relying on an innovative DEA non-parametric approach to assess firm performance. 
   
The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 
3 explains the methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the results and Section 5 serves as a conclusion.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
According to signaling theory (Spence, 1973), the primary objective of corporate disclosure is to inform 
analysts and investors about the firm quality and value. This suggests that voluntary disclosure decisions lead to the 
reporting of relevant information about firm performance. Based on these theoretical suggestions, prior studies have 
attempted to empirically examine the relevance of corporate voluntary disclosure.     
  
Several studies evidence the relevance of corporate voluntary disclosure by its effect on the cost of capital. 
They point out that firms which have increased the level of voluntary disclosure show a lower cost of capital 
(Botosan, 1997; Piotroski, 1999; Verrecchia, 2001; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). In this regard, Gietzmann and 
Ireland (2005), Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) and Francis et al. (2008) find a negative association between 
voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital. Some other studies examine the relevance of corporate voluntary 
disclosure through its effect on the firm value (Lajili and Zeghal, 2006; Cheung et al., 2010; Hassan and Mohd-
Saleh, 2010; d’Al-Akraa and Jahangir-Ali, 2012). They evidence the existence of a positive relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and the firm value. Hence, they highlight the significant signaling role of corporate voluntary 
disclosure. For instance, Hassan et al. (2009) specify that corporate voluntary disclosure mitigates uncertainty 
surrounding firm growth perspectives and facilitates share trading. Consequently voluntary disclosure is likely to 
affect the firm value.  Based on the arguments of the signaling theory and the empirical results of prior studies, we 
anticipate that corporate voluntary disclosure may be considered as a signaling tool revealing firm performance.  
 
An important element of debate in finance research is how to assess firm performance. Performance 
evaluation through the income statement is the most common approach. Several criticisms have been addressed to 
the use of accounting measures of performance (Benston, 1985). Market evaluation through for instance market-to-
book ratio or Tobin’s Q could be presented as alternative estimates of firm performance. However, market values 
depend on investor confidence and on other factors outside the direct control of firms (Nanka-Bruce, 2009). Thus, 
market values as measures of performance are not entirely attributable to firm specific characteristics (Nanka-Bruce, 
2009).  
 
In this study, we deploy another alternative multidimensional measure of performance to counteract such 
difficulties. This measure of performance is based on technical efficiency through both parametric and non-
parametric approaches. Note that Technical efficiency relates to the success of firms to produce maximum outputs 
from a set of inputs under a given production technology (Nanka-Bruce, 2009). Some previous papers have linked 
technical efficiency to a number of corporate governance aspects, such as board of directors and ownership 
structure. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no study has associated this alternative measure of 
performance with corporate disclosure policy. To summarize, this study aims explicitly to investigate the link 
between the level of corporate voluntary disclosure indexes and firm multidimensional performance proxies. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Estimating Firm Performance Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
In this paper, we measure multidimensional firm performance using a non-parametric approach of data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). In this approach, each firm represents a unique decision making unit (DMU). Based 
on rigorous linear mathematical programming, the method focuses on the observed data of each DMU. This method 
makes it possible to draw conclusions based on efficiency comparisons with peers, and gives indications regarding 
needed policy changes (Charnes et al., 1994). In other words, it distinguishes inefficient DMUs from efficient ones 
based on whether or not they lie on the efficient frontier of the possibility set. This set is composed of all feasible 
input-output combinations with a production technology that transforms a vector of N inputs 
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N
Nxxx    ),...,( 1  into a vector of P outputs
P
Pyyy    ),...,( 1 . This possibility set T can be formulated 
as follows:    
 
T = {(x, y)
PN
 : x
N
  can produce y
P
 } 
 
We analyze the relative performance using an output-oriented projection model, producing the largest 
possible outputs from a given set of inputs. Efficient firms are those that succeed in using minimum inputs to 
produce maximum outputs. Concretely, we measure firm performance via its value-creation capacity and, in 
particular, we examine corporate managers’ ability to maximize firm value with an optimal allocation of the same 
inputs. In other words, we examine whether operating and investment decisions are optimal with regard to obtaining 
a higher firm value. We use firm value proxies as outputs and operating and investment policy proxies as inputs.   
 
Inputs And Outputs Selection  
 
The principal difficulty with the DEA approach is the choice and specification of inputs and outputs. We 
base our selection of inputs and outputs on prior research. We select determinants of firm value that are widely used 
in corporate finance. Figure 1 illustrates the modeling of firm performance. Table 1 presents the selected inputs and 
outputs of our DEA analysis, the variable measurements and the main corresponding references, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 1: Firm Performance Modeling Using DEA 
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Table 1: Outputs And Inputs Of The Firm Performance Analysis 
Variables References References 
Outputs 
Firm value 
Tobin’s Q = Market value of stock + Accounting 
value of the total debt / Total assets 
Himmelberg et al. (1999); Holderness et al. (1999) and 
Drobetz et al. (2004). 
Firm 
profitability 
Return on equity (ROE) = Net benefit / 
Ownership equity 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Holderness and Sheehan 
(1988); Denis and Denis (1994); Thomsen and Pedersen 
(1996) and Li and Simerly (1998). 
Inputs 
Financial 
policy 
Total debt / Total assets 
Holderness et al. (1999); Short and Keasey (1999); 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2003); Habid and Ljungqvist 
(2005); Bailey et al. (2006) and Zarb (2007).   
Investment 
policy 
Tangible assets / Sales 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Klapper and Love (2004); 
Habid and Ljungqvist (2005) and Ammann et al. (2011).  
R&D activity R&D expenses / Sales 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Smith and Watts (1992); Cho 
(1998); Himmelberg et al. (1999); Habid and Ljungqvist 
(2005); Olsen and Elango (2005) and Ammann et al. 
(2011). 
Operating 
profitability 
Profit before taxes / Sales Habid and Ljungqvist (2005) and Ammann et al. (2011).   
Sales growth Sales t - Sales t-1 / Sales t 
Short and Keasey (1999); Olsen and Elango (2005); 
Bailey et al. (2006); LaPointe et al. (2006); Banghφj and 
Plenborg (2008); Hassan et al. (2009) and Ammann et al. 
(2011). 
Financial 
liquidity 
Free cash flow / Total assets 
Cho (1998); Thomsen and Pedersen (2000); Seifert et al. 
(2005) and Ammann et al. (2011). 
 
Empirical Specification 
 
To test the relationship between corporate voluntary disclosure and firm performance, we deploy the logit 
model presented below. The dependent variable (PEFF) takes the value of 1 if a firm is located on the efficiency 
frontier and 0 otherwise. The voluntary disclosure level is used as an independent variable. Firm size, analyst 
following, dividend policy and industry are deployed as control variables.  
 
PEFF it = α 0 + α 1 VD it + α 2 SIZ it + α 3 ANF it + α 4 DPS it + α 5 IND it + µ it 
 
Where for firm i in year t: VD is equal to the global disclosure index. SIZ is the logarithm of total assets. 
ANF is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of financial analysts. DPS is the dividend per share. IND is a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company operates in a high-technology sector and 0 otherwise. μ is the error 
term. 
 
The independent variable (VD) is the voluntary disclosure score derived from annual reports. We focus on 
the annual report for several reasons. Firstly, the annual report is considered as the main source of mandatory as well 
as voluntary disclosures, providing important information for analysts and investors (Wiseman, 1982; Rockness, 
1985; Neu et al., 1998). Secondly, the level of firm disclosure is best evidenced by the amount of information 
contained in an annual report (Zarb, 2007). For instance, Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Holland (1998) find a high 
positive correlation between corporate disclosure in annual reports and other forms of disclosures. The independent 
variable (VD) is measured using self-constructed disclosure indexes. We develop a disclosure checklist inspired 
from Meek et al. (1995), Botosan (1997), Chau and Gray (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Lim et al. (2007) and Francis 
et al. (2008). This checklist consists of 112 items (see Appendix) falling into four general categories, namely, 
strategic information (STGVD, 30 items), non-financial information (NFNVD, 35 items), financial information 
(FNVD, 36 items), and corporate governance information (GOVVD, 11 items). Following Cooke (1992), we 
conduct a content analysis to identify the needed information in annual reports. ARVD is the sum of the scores 
attributed to each item in the voluntary disclosure checklist. 
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The Appendix presents the checklist of 112 items included in the disclosure scores. To avoid subjectivity, 
we consider all the disclosed items as equally important, despite the possible variability of information content from 
one item to another. Thus, we assign a value of 1 when a given item is disclosed and 0 otherwise. The total score is 
computed as the unweighted score sum of all index items. 
 
The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that firm size affects firm performance because of 
its impact on ownership structure and the resulting agency problems/conflicts of interest.  Indeed, large firms 
generally realize scale economies which, in turn, influence firm performance (Nanka-Bruce, 2009). 
 
Financial analysts are likely to play a significant role in reducing information asymmetry between 
corporate managers and investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Analysts select firms that are likely to have the most 
profitable and least risky securities (Boubaker and Labegorre, 2006). As a result, analyst following may reflect firm 
performance and/or quality to stock market participants. Empirical studies (Pearson, 1992; Chung, 2000; Lang et al., 
2004) confirm the signaling role of analyst following. They demonstrate a positive relationship between analyst 
following and firm value. 
 
According to the signaling theory, the dividend distribution is considered a signal of firm performance. 
Indeed, in an uncertain economic environment where external investors do not have perfect information about firm 
profitability, dividends are likely to inform about firm expected cash flows (Bhattacharya, 1979, 1980; Kalay, 1980; 
Miller and Rock, 1985).  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Sample Selection And Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our initial sample consists of all SBF 250 French firms listed the on Euronext stock market from 2004 to 
2009. We exclude financial and assimilated firms (SIC codes 4900–4999 and 6000–6999) because they operate in an 
environment where disclosure is more likely to be a result of specific legal and regulatory requirements. 
Furthermore, we discard all firms with missing financial or governance data. Finally, we obtain a sample 1074 
firms-years (179 firms). Financial figures are obtained from Worldscope database. Corporate annual reports are 
downloaded from the French stock market authority (AMF) website. 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and the independent variables. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
Variables N Min 25% Mean Median 75% Max St. Dev. 
Dependent Variable 
PEFF 179 0 0 0.2672 0 1 1 0.4427 
Independent Variables 
ARVD 179 0.0708 0.3438 0.4300 0.4367 0.5044 0.7122 0.1250 
STGVD 179 0.0333 0.3513 0.4463 0.4420 0.5440 0.7667 0.1435 
NFNVD 179 0 0.27 0.3796 0.3714 0.5091 0.756 0.1554 
FNVD 179 0 0.2784 0.3860 0.3618 0.4663 0.9091 0.1629 
GOVVD 179 0.0909 0.3725 0.5647 0.5455 0.7273 1 0.2303 
Control Variables 
SIZ 179 8.9369 12.8142 14.1258 13.7865 15.4469 18.9310 1.9102 
ANF 179 0 1.6094 2.0673 2.1972 2.6391 3.5553 0.7386 
DPS 179 0 0.11 1.0473 0.6 1.23 30 2.2668 
IND 179 0 0 0.1955 0 0 1 0.3968 
 
The descriptive statistics show that, on average, 26.72% of our sample is located on the efficiency frontier 
with a standard deviation of 44.27%. We can notice a divergence in the efficiency of these firms. We can also detect 
diversity in the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure in annual reports. The ARVD ranges from a low value of 
0.0708 to a high value of 0.7122. The mean score is 0.43, with a standard deviation of 12.50%. 
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Regression Results 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression model testing for the relationship between disclosure index 
and firm performance and controlling for firm size, analyst following, dividend policy and industry. 
 
The findings show a positive and statistically significant relationship between the PEFF and VD (measured 
here by ARVD) variables. They validate our hypothesis predicting the existence of an association between the level 
of corporate voluntary disclosures and firm performance proxies. Hence, voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
plays an important signaling role. It provides relevant information explaining firm performance and quality. These 
findings are consistent with previous studies (e.g. Uyar and Kiliç, 2012) which have demonstrated the significance 
of voluntary information in revealing firm quality and value.  
 
Table 3: Value Relevance Of The Extent Of Voluntary Disclosure In Annual Reports 
 Variables Coefficient  t-statistic Marginal probability 
   Constant 2.9926*** 4.623 0.5604 
VD 1.6291*** 2.910 0.3051 
SIZ -0.3232*** -6.095 -0.0605 
ANF -0.1042 -0.832 -0.0195 
DPS 0.0197 0.681 0.0037 
IND -0.3479* -1.870 -0.0616 
Pseudo R² 0.0629 
Log likelihood -584.2179 
LR Chi2 
(Prob > Chi2) 
78.4341 
(0.0000) 
 
Further analyses show that the relevance of voluntary disclosure is not homogenous for all information 
categories. The PEFF variable is negatively and significantly explained by STGVD and GOVVD variables. The 
NFNVD variable is positively and significantly related to firm performance proxies. These findings raise the 
question of the extent to which each voluntary information category in annual reports reveals firm performance. 
Hence, corporate voluntary disclosure decisions appear to be driven by incentives and constraints. Firms may find it 
advantageous to disclose additional pieces of information (i.e., non-financial voluntary information). In contrast, 
they may find it disadvantageous to disclose relevant strategic information when they operate especially in a high 
competitive market. This may explain the divergence in the relevance of voluntary information categories. 
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Table 4: The Relevance Of Voluntary Information Categories In Annual Reports 
Variable 
Coefficient t-statistic Marginal 
prob. 
Coefficient t-statistic Marginal 
prob. 
Coefficient t-statistic Marginal 
prob. 
Coefficient t-statistic Marginal 
prob. 
Constant 4.0346*** 6.128 0.7539 3.5515*** 5.712 0.6668 3.3503*** 5.321 0.6283 3.8429*** 5.971 0.7189 
STGVD -1.1838** -2.405 -0.2212          
NFNVD    0.0535 0.117 0.0101       
FNVD       0.7766* 1.780 0.1456    
GOVVD          -0.6091** -1.982 -0.1139 
SIZ -0.3192*** -5.990 -0.0596 -0.3181*** -5.921 -0.0597 -0.3254*** -6.114 -0.0610 -0.3158*** -5.937 -0.0591 
ANF -0.0348 -0.281 -0.0065 -0.0655 -0.530 -0.0123 -0.0596 -0.482 -0.0112 -0.0418 -0.339 -0.0078 
DPS 0.0284 0.977 0.0053 0.0195 0.675 0.0036 0.0246 0.844 0.0046 0.0182 0.628 0.0034 
IND 0.0284 -1.340 -0.0448 -0.3086* -1.657 -0.0552 -0.316* -1.707 -0.0564 -0.2925 -1.578 -0.0522 
Pseudo R² 0.06066 0.0560 0.0585 0.0592  
Log 
likelihood 
-585.6201 -588.5187 586.9656 -586.5564 
LR Chi
2
 
(Prob > Chi
2
) 
75.6298 
(0.0000) 
69.8326 
(0.0000) 
72.9656 
(0.0000) 
73.7571 
(0.0000) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper empirically investigated the relationship between corporate voluntary disclosure and firm performance. Based on the signaling theory, we 
considered corporate voluntary disclosure as a signaling instrument reporting firm performance to investors and financial analysts.  
 
The empirical analyses were based on panel data of 1074 firms-year listed on the Euronext Paris stock market. Performance evaluation has been a 
critical area of research. We discussed the limits of accounting and financial performance measures and attempted to take into account the multidimensionality of 
firm performance. Thus, we used a non-parametric approach to measure firm performance via the technical efficiency. Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), 
we measured a firm ability to maximize its value (outputs) given a set of determinants (inputs). The estimated efficiency scores were used as a dependent 
variable. We used disclosure indexes which measure the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports as independent variable.   
 
The empirical findings reveal a positive relationship between disclosure indexes and performance measures. They provide evidence that the level of 
voluntary information disclosed in annual reports plays a significant signaling role of firm performance. However, the extent of this role depends on the nature of 
the voluntary disclosure, i.e. whether it involves strategic, financial or corporate governance information.  
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APPENDIX: Checklist Of Voluntary Disclosure 
 
Checklist Of Items References Checklist Of Items References 
A - Strategic information  30. Description of capital project committed A, B, C 
A1. General information about the  
Firm 
 B - Non-financial information  
1. Brief  history of the company A, B, C, E B1. Employee information  
2. General description of the business B, D 1. Geographical distribution of employees A, C 
3. Main products B, D 2. Number of employees by gender A, C 
4. Main markets B, D 3. Number of employees by age A, C 
A2. Corporate strategy  4. Categories of employees by  function A, C 
5. Statement of the main objectives A, B, C, D, E 
5. Number of employees for two or more 
years 
A, C, E 
6. Statement of the financial objectives A, C, E 6. Average compensation per employee A, B 
7. Current strategy A, B, C, F 7. Added value per employee A, B 
8. Impact of strategy on current results B 8. Data productivity A, B, C 
9. Future strategy A, B, C 9. Safety policy A, B, C 
10. Impact of strategy on future results A, C, E 10. Cost of safety measures A, C 
A3. R&D activities  11. Data on accidents A, C, E 
11. Description of R&D projects A, C 12. Policy on communication A, C 
12. Corporate policy on R&D A, C 13. Redundancy information A, C 
13. Location of R&D activities A, C, D 
14. Reason for changes in employee numbers 
or categories over time 
A, C 
14. Number employed in R&D  A, C, E 15. Recruitment problems and related policy A, C 
A4. Analysis and discussion of  
management review of projects 
 B2. Information about the training policy  
15. Review of operations B 16. Amount spent in training programs A, C, E 
16. Competitive environment B, D 17. Nature of training A, C, E 
17. The most significant events B, D 18. Policy on training A, C, E 
18. Change in sales and profits B, D 19. Categories of employees trained A, C, E 
19. Change in cost of goods sold B, D 
B3. Social policy and value-added 
information 
 
20. Change in expenses B, D 20. Safety of products A, C 
21. Change in inventory B, D 21. Program of environmental protection A, C, E 
22. Change in share price B, D 22. Charitable donations A, C, E 
A5. Future prospects  23. Community programs A, C, E 
23. Future development channels A, B, C 24. Value-added data A, C, E 
24. Qualitative forecast of sales A, B, C, E 25. Value-added ratios A, C, E 
25. Quantitative forecast of sales A, B, C, D, F 26. Qualitative value-added information A, C, E 
26. Qualitative forecast of profits 
A, B, C, D, 
E, F 
B4.  Segmental information  
27. Quantitative forecast of profits A, B, C, E 
27. Geographical distribution of invested 
capital 
A, C, E 
28. Assumptions underlying the forecasts A, B, C 28. Geographical distribution of net assets A, C 
29. Review of forecasts A, B, C   
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Checklist of voluntary disclosure (continued) 
Checklist Of Items References Checklist Of Items References 
29. Geographical distribution of production A, C, E 21. Estimates of capital increase A, B, C 
30. Expenditure on the business lines A, C 22. Earnings estimates A, B, C 
31. Revenue by business line A, C 
23. Effect of inflation currency fluctuations on 
future operations 
A, C 
32. Competitor analysis - quantitative A, C 
24. Effect of currency fluctuations of interest 
rates on future operations 
A, C 
33. Competitor analysis - qualitative A, C 
 
C4. Information on exchange rates 
 
34. Market share analysis – quantitative A, C 
25. Impact of currency fluctuations on current 
results 
A, B, C 
35. Market share analysis - qualitative A, C 
26. Impact of currency fluctuations on future 
operations 
A, C, E 
C-Financial information  27. Estimates of currency fluctuations A, B, C 
C1. Performance indicators (not included 
in the financial statements) 
 28. Exchange rates used in accounting A, B, C 
1. Performance indicators A, B, C 29. Long-term debt by currency A, C 
2. Financial data for the last five years 
A, B, C, D, 
E 
30. Short-term debt by currency A, C 
3. Turnover 
A, B, C, D, 
F 
C5. Other financial information  
4. Net income 
A, B, C, D, 
F 
31. Share price at year end A, C 
5. Shareholders’ equity A, B, C, D, 32. Share prices trend A, C, E 
6. Total assets 
A, B, C, D, 
F 
33. Market capitalization at year end A, C, E 
7. Earnings per share A, B, C, 34. Trend of market capitalization A, C 
8. Dividend payout policy A, B, C, 35. Size of shareholdings A, C 
9. Transfer pricing policy A, B, C, 36. Forecast market share A, C, D, F 
10. Impact of any accounting policy 
changes on results 
A, B, C, D- Governance information  
11. Advertising expenditure A, B, C, E 1. Ownership structure A, C 
12. Effect of inflation on results A, B, C 2. Organizational chart A, B, C, E 
13. Effect of inflation on assets A, B, C Composition of the board of directors  
14. Effect of fluctuating interest rates on 
results 
A, B, C, E 3. Personal profiles A, C 
C2.  Financial ratios  4. Descriptions of the positions occupied A, C 
15. Liquidity ratio  A, B, C, E 5. Length of time belonging to the company A, B, C 
16. Turnover ratio of assets A, B, C 
6. Number of shareholders sitting on  the board 
of directors 
A, B, C 
17. Debt ratio A, B, C, E 7. Academic profile of the directors A, B, C 
18. Profitability ratios 
A, B, C, E, 
F 
8. Presence of an Internal Audit Committee A, B, C 
19. Other useful ratios A, B, C, E 9. Age of the executives A, B, C 
C3. Forecast information  10. Profile of the executives A, B, C 
20. Cash flow forecast A, B, C, D 11. Individual remuneration A, B, C 
 
A: Meek et al. (1995). 
B: Eng and Mak (2003). 
C: Chau and Gray (2002). 
D: Botosan (1997). 
E: Lim et al. (2007). 
F: Francis et al. (2008). 
 
